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Keeping the Past Alive: Memories of Israeli Jews
at the Turn of the Millennium
Howard Schuman,1,3 Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi,2 and Amiram D. Vinokur1
We asked in an open-ended way in 1999–2000 what national and world
events Israeli Jews consider most important from the past 60 years. Ten events
were identified as foremost, including three from the time of independence and
one that was quite recent. All the major memories are associated with efforts
of the state through commemorations and in other ways to create a unitary
collective memory. Five social background variables help account for which
events are mentioned as most important: birth cohort, education, gender, eth-
nic origin, and religiosity. Other specific factors such as personal Holocaust
experience and voting preferences are also considered.
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“Collective memory,” a concept drawn from the writings of Halbwachs
([1950] 1980, [1925] 1992), can be studied both at the societal level and at
the level of individual memories (Olick, 1999; Young, 1993). Although it is
plausible to assume that the two levels were generally consistent in stable,
traditional societies, especially prior to the emergence of historiography as
a serious pursuit (Nora, 1996–98; Yerushalmi, 1982), in complex, rapidly
changing modern societies there can be considerable divergence between
the two (e.g., Schwartz and Schuman, 2000). Yet even in a modern nation,
when it sees itself as under serious threat, there is usually great pressure for
the two levels of memory of relevant events to coalesce. Israel’s short history
as a modern state has been marked by a succession of events so crucial to
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survival that it has seen itself as under siege from its beginning until today.
Thus the state has regarded the creation of a unified collective memory as
an important goal. An additional reason for strong efforts in this direction
arises because the nation comprises diverse streams of immigration having
little in common initially except an identity as Jews, and in some cases even
that identity has been imposed more by definitions of other people (e.g.,
Germans or Russians) than by personal choice.
Every nation attempts to shape the memories of its citizens to create
not only a sense of common history, but out of it a common identity. Na-
tions do this through the commemoration of crucial past events and symbols
(Schwartz, 1982, 2001), teaching and textbooks (Nash et al., 1997; Novick,
1988), and whatever other means of instruction and ritual can be brought to
the task (Kertzer, 1988). Because the challenges for Israel are greater than
for most nations, the state has devoted considerable energy to developing
and maintaining common memories of events that are regarded as vital to
its identity. Some of these are from the remote past (Ben-Yehuda, 1995;
Zerubavel, 1995), but increasingly they are events important to Israel’s cre-
ation and continued existence. Reflecting these latter emphases is the new
national calendar that was added after the establishment of the state, which
consists of official commemorations for the Holocaust, for soldiers killed in
defense of the country, and for the establishment of the state itself (Indepen-
dence Day; see Handelman and Katz, 1990, for an illuminating discussion). In
an important sense, Holocaust Remembrance Day can be regarded as point-
ing to the past victimization of Jews, while Independence Day, together with
the immediately preceding Remembrance Day for Fallen Soldiers, provide
the response by recognizing the creation of a separate, strong nation to pre-
vent the reoccurrence of anything like the Holocaust. There has now been
added a Memorial Day for Yitzhak Rabin, recognizing both his importance
in the life of the nation and the critical need to avoid violence within the
society, though this most recent commemoration will not likely be entirely
unifying because of the divisions over Rabin’s negotiations with the PLO
leadership (Vinitzky-Seroussi, 1998, 2001). The deliberate shaping of Israeli
collective memory provides a backdrop and counterpoint to bear in mind as
we consider differences in memory within the total Jewish population.4
4Israeli Arabs were not included in our investigation; thus when we use the term “Israelis,”
readers should interpret it to refer to Israeli Jews only. In a country where the “institutions,
official holidays, symbols, and heroes are exclusively Jewish” (Smooha, 1993:325), it makes
sense, especially with limited resources, to focus a theoretical inquiry into collective memory
in this way, though for other purposes Israeli Arabs and Jews would be equally relevant. None
of the commemorations noted above would have a similar meaning to Israeli Arabs and to
Israeli Jews.
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Differences there are, for the Israeli public is far from homogeneous,
even apart from its Arab citizens. The lack of homogeneity stems not only
from immigration from different parts of the world, but also from sharp dif-
ferences in religious adherence in a state where civil and religious spheres
are not distinct, and from variation along the lines of generation or co-
hort, education, and the linkages of these to social class. We look at Israeli
Jewish memories as they are influenced by such differences at the turn
of the millennium, while at the same time bearing in mind the deliber-
ate efforts by the state and its institutions to encourage a single, shared
collective memory. Our primary evidence will be the national and world
events that a cross-sectional sample of Israeli Jewish adults remember as
important from the past 60 years. After first discussing the events that
are spontaneously remembered as most significant, we explore systemat-
ically the possible sources of these memories that can be studied using
five individual attributes: cohort location, educational level, ethnic origin,
gender, and religiosity. Although these attributes are measured at the indi-
vidual level, each connects the individual to larger groupings within the so-
ciety, though the groupings vary greatly in their degree of self-consciousness
and cohesion. Other possible sources relevant to particular events are also
considered.
One general source of memory is cohort or generational location and
experience. More than half a century ago, Mannheim ([1928] 1952) theorized
that each “generation” receives a distinctive imprint from the social and po-
litical events of its youth, and Schuman and Scott (1989) inferred from this
that a succession of cohorts should have somewhat different collective mem-
ories. Empirical evidence in support of the proposition has been found in
their own study of Americans and in several other national surveys (Rieger,
1995; Schuman et al., 1994; Schuman et al., 1998; Scott and Zac, 1998), as
well as in a range of other research (Rubin et al., 1998). One of our aims
was to investigate the hypothesis further in a nation such as Israel where
the entire history has been lived through by its oldest members and where,
equally important, every few years have brought some new national trauma.
A second basic social factor, education, can be thought of as competing
with cohort effects (Hyman et al., 1975). Education allows individuals to
transcend their own lives and experience vicariously events that they did not
personally live through. Israelis of age 30 can learn a great deal about World
War II, though they were born well after it ended, and the same Israelis may
have seen televised pictures of the 1969 moon landing, though it had nothing
directly to do with life in Israel. The educational system is also a major means
by which the Israeli government communicates collective memories to new
cohorts of children that pass through state schools, including the children of
recent immigrants (Durkheim, 1956). Thus we were interested in comparing
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what is attributable to number of years of schooling with what has been
learned from cohort experience.5
More generally, “memories” can be based either on personal experi-
ence, as in the case of a 70-year-old individual who fought at the time of
independence in 1948, or on what is learned in school or in other indirect
ways about an earlier event, as would be true of 30-year-olds who mention
the Independence of Israel as an important event from the past. (Even a
70-year-old who had immigrated to Israel from, say, North Africa as an adult
may have “memories” of Israel’s independence or of the Holocaust based on
indirect learning from commemorative occasions and in other ways, rather
than as a result of personal experience.) Other things equal, we expect per-
sonal experience to be more likely than indirect learning to make an event
seem important and more readily recalled. However, personal experience
can be approximated to a meaningful degree where there is strong emotional
as well as intellectual involvement in an earlier event: a compelling example
is the visits by many Israeli high-school students to the sites of death camps
in Poland (Feldman, 2000a,b).
A third factor, gender, appears important in relation to military events in
particular. Most Israeli males train for military combat, and military service
is more central to the society than in most countries. In a more general
sense, what has been called “the new Hebrew man” evokes an emphasis
on masculinity with regard to the origin and development of the society
that might well involve differences in memories between men and women
(Lentin, 2000: esp. 177–212). Beyond these factors specific to Israel, there
is evidence from other countries of differences between men and women in
political matters more generally. Verba et al. (1997) review carefully a broad
array of evidence from the United States and conclude that, on average,
women “are less politically interested and informed . . . than men” (1051).6
At the same time, studies by Davis (1999) indicate that females tended to
recall more childhood autobiographical memories than males, especially
those having strong emotional resonance. Whether similar phenomena occur
5Education can also serve as an indicator of social class, but in addition we had available a five-
point self-report scale of income level (from much lower than average to much higher than
average) and indicate in a later footnote the one additional result it yielded when included in
our analysis.
6For a review of earlier research, see Randall, 1987:79: “The most solidly founded [assertion
about women] is that they know less about politics, are less interested and less psychologically
involved in it than men.” Here as elsewhere, the authors are not speaking of categorical
differences; there are no doubt many exceptions, and it is only gender averages over the total
population that differ, which may be the result of socialization practices. Furthermore, most
of the gender differences occur at lower SES levels, as we report later and Evans (1980:219)
also notes. At more elite levels, women have come to play an important part in Israeli protest
movements (e.g., see Helman and Rapoport, 1997).
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for collective memories of the past in Israel is a question we address, also
bringing in evidence from several other countries where questions about
memories have been asked.
Cohort location, education, and gender are important in defining direct
and indirect experience in all societies. In Israel there are at least two other
fundamental ways in which the population is divided. One is ethnic origin:
whether individuals or their parents were born in Israel or arrived from
another part of the world, and, if the latter, whether from a European or
American background or from one of the African or Asian countries. There
is the direct effect of growing up in a quite different society, and even for
those born in Israel, parental teaching, like education, can provide a vicarious
picture of past events that may differ from what is experienced by individuals
whose parents were socialized from early childhood in Israel.
The final factor is religiosity, seen in Israel as varying along a dimension
from ultraorthodoxy to a totally secular orientation. This factor has become
increasingly important both in itself and in relation to political issues, so we
expected it to influence memories of past events that define the nature of
the state (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989). In sum, cohort, education, gender,
ethnic origin, and religiosity are ways in which we attempt to understand
which events Israelis report to be most important from the past 6 decades.
At the same time, we keep in mind the forces in Israeli society that work
against differences in terms of individual attributes and background, in order
to produce a shared memory of the past 6 decades. As James Young has
written in The Texture of Memory (1993:211), “Having defined themselves
as a people through commemorative recitations of their past, the Jews now
depend on memory for their very existence as a nation.”
METHOD
We asked the following open-ended question in Hebrew to probability
samples of Israelis in 1999 and 2000:
From all the events and changes that occurred in the country and the world over the
last 60 years, please mention two or three events that seem to you most important. [If
a respondent named only one event, interviewers were instructed to ask the person
to mention at least two events that seemed important.]
Our goal was to obtain what was most salient to individuals when
prompted by a quite general question, with the word “important” included
to filter out minor sports or entertainment events. We are also focusing on
recent events that have a reality different from the more mythic objects that
have been the subject of other important studies of Israeli collective mem-
ory (e.g., Ben-Yehuda, 1995; Zerubavel, 1995). We chose a time frame of
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60 years to allow inclusion of the origin of Israel and related events; it also
fits with most past studies, thus providing useful cross-national comparisons.7
Our sample consists of 1041 respondents interviewed in April of 1999
and 1002 respondents interviewed in February of 2000, for a total of 2043. (A
small number of additional cases are lost on specific variables due to item
nonresponse; effective numbers of cases are given below.) We looked for
change between responses in 1999 and 2000 because of Ehud Barak’s elec-
tion in May 1999 and his emphasis on serious peace negotiations with both
Palestinians and Syrians. However, little had actually happened between the
two surveys, and only seven respondents in the 2000 survey mentioned the
election as one of three important events. Because no large or significant
differences exist between the two surveys in terms of age, education, origin,
religion, or gender, we have combined them to maximize sample size, but as
a safeguard we included “survey year” as a control variable in a number of
analyses. (As the surveys were carried out in early 1999 and early 2000, they
cannot address more recent events, such as the second Palestinian intifada
beginning in 2000 and the 2001 election.)
Our question was included in omnibus surveys carried out by the firm of
Gallup Israel. The surveys were administered by telephone in a short period
of time (two days for each survey, between 3:30 P.M. and 10 P.M.), with three call-
backs attempted when numbers were not answered. The cooperation rate
(proportion of interviews from households actually contacted and containing
an eligible respondent) was 33%.8 Such data would not be desirable for
making a precise prediction about a close election, though Gallup Israel,
using very similar methods, has been quite successful in predicting recent
Israeli elections, including the election in 2001. For the broad sketching of
long-term memories of the past, however, we consider the data adequate,
especially because two recent careful studies have shown much less effect
due to large variations in response rates than had been previously assumed
(see Curtin et al., 2000; Keeter et al., 2000).The sample represents well the
demographic structure of the Israeli population, as indicated below, and we
7As the questionnaire was administered in Hebrew, those unable to understand the language—
mainly recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union—were not included. However, we
are able to identify the substantial number of former Soviet immigrants (9.2% of our sample)
who could respond to the questionnaire, and we note any differences they show from others
from Europe or America.
8This is for the 2000 survey. Gallup Israel did not calculate exact rates for the 1999 survey but
stated that it was carried out in exactly the same way and should have had essentially the same
rates. Their contact rate is 50% (treating repeated answering machines as part of noncontact),
yielding a total response rate of 16.5% though some of the nonresponse probably came from
ineligible numbers (nonworking phones, non-Hebrew-speaking households, etc.). A common
practice today for those using the guidelines of the American Association for Public Research
is to assume noncontacts to be divided between completed interviews and refusals in the same
proportions as contacts, which would raise the calculated response rate appreciably.
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believe that the nonresponse is almost entirely unrelated to the dependent
variables on which we focus.
Our five main social background variables match closely recent census
information on the population structure. For example, census and survey
data on grouped age categories, as reported by the Israel Central Bureau of
Statistics, 1999, are as follows:








Similarly, our survey findings for education, gender, and ethnic origin are
all within two or three percentage points of census results. The largest de-
viation is for religiosity, where the survey somewhat underrepresents the
ultraorthodox (5% as against 8% in the census), presumably because they
are less accessible and more reluctant respondents.9 Most of our results are
also reasonably consistent with patterns discovered in other countries where
meaningful comparisons can be made.
The five social background factors considered as primary explanatory
variables show distributions as follows (numbers of cases are in parenthe-
ses, with the difference from the total of 2043 indicating missing data on
particular variables):
Age, which we interpret as mainly an indicator of cohort experience, is broken into
12 ordinal categories. The categories are 5 years in width, with the exception of larger
ranges at the two ends of the age continuum. See Fig. 1 for the categories used and
the number of cases in each category.
Education was grouped by the survey into four categories:
1. Less than high school 11.7%
2. High school 41.6
3. Above high school but less than full college 18.5
9The 1991 survey that formed the basis for the Guttman Report gives 6% as the ultraorthodox
component of the population (Katz, 1997). Gallup Israel also includes a weight variable to
make the sample fit the overall population even more closely, but weighting the data does not
change our results at any important point (e.g., the ordering of responses in Table I is essentially
unchanged, with the largest alteration an increase of 4% in Holocaust mentions), and we have
preferred to use unweighted data because it is simpler from a statistical standpoint. Repeating
key analyses using weighted data did not alter any of our conclusions.
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4. B.A. and higher. 28.2
100 (N = 1977)
Ethnic origin, following a standard conceptualization in Israel (Smooha, 1993), is
classified based on where the respondent and the respondent’s father were born:10
1. Both respondent and father born in Israel 17.9%
2. Israeli born but father born in Africa or Asia 25.7
3. Israeli born but father born in Europe or America 21.5
4. Respondent born in Asia or Africa 14.0
5. Respondent born in Europe or America 20.8
100 (N = 1958)
Religiosity:
1. Ultraorthodox (haredi) 5.0%
2. Orthodox (dati) 9.1
3. Traditional (masorti)11 30.7
4. Secular (hiloni). 55.2




100 (N = 2008)
Except where explicitly noted, our analysis regularly includes all five of these
variables in multiple logistic regressions; thus, reported results for each vari-
able are controlled statistically for the others. Education is treated as a con-
tinuous variable, while gender, origin, and religiosity are usually treated as
sets of dummy variables. The empirical ordering of the religiosity categories
indicates that they are virtually always ordinal in relation to mentions of par-
ticular events, and they are sometimes treated in that way as well.12 Age is
treated both ways, with the dummy variable form employed when construct-
ing figures, in which case it is also conceptualized as birth cohorts in terms
10We would have preferred to have mother’s place of birth as well, but for categories 1, 4,
and 5 there were probably few “mixed marriages” across continents, and in any case the
focus for these categories is on where the respondent was born and socialized. Categories
2 and 3 are already intermediate in terms of socialization experience, so adding a relatively
small proportion of mixed marriages would simply have made them more so, though we
might have created “mixed” as a small sixth category to examine as well. (The proportion of
marriages between Jews from Europe/America and Jews from Africa/Asia has been estimated
to approach 25%; see volume 6 of the Hebrew Encyclopedia (Jerusalem: 1993)).
11“Traditional” refers to some observance but considerably relaxed in terms of orthodox
prescriptions and proscriptions. It is most characteristic of those from African/Asian back-
grounds, which in turn ordinarily means North Africa, Iraq, Iran, and neighboring countries.
12The ordinality is consistent with the Guttman Institute data reported by Levy et al. (1997) and
with their final sentence, “There is a continuum from the strictly observant to the nonobservant
rather than a great divide between a religious minority and a secular majority.”
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of labeling; it is used as a continuous variable when calculating regression
statistics.13
RESULTS
We begin by considering the events of the past 60 years that came to
mind as important to Israelis in response to our open-ended question at
the turn of the millennium. The main results are presented in two forms in
Table I: the percentage giving a particular event as their first response, and
the percentage giving the event (as against all other events combined) as
one of up to three responses recorded. The former method of percentaging
produces mutually exclusive categories that add to 100%, but does not in-
clude second or third responses. The latter method provides dichotomous
percentages that make use of all responses and is more amenable to analysis;
it does not yield mutually exclusive categories, as the same respondent can
be included under up to three different events.
The 10 most frequently mentioned events are listed in Table I, using as
a cutoff point for inclusion the requirement that an event be mentioned by
at least 5% of those able to mention any event (column 5), though we add
one recent war that just misses 5%. The establishment of the nation in 1948
was mentioned most often, followed by the recent assassination of Prime
13The relations among the five variables, though conventionally significant (p < .05) in most
cases, are too small to have much effect even in simple cross-tabulations. (In addition,
whatever tiny effect they could have is ruled out by our regular inclusion of them in multiple
logistic regression.). Treating education, age/cohort (young coded higher), gender (women
coded higher), and religiosity (secular coded higher) as continuous, the correlation matrix is
as follows:
Age Education Religiosity Gender
Age — .09, p = .01 −.04, p < .05 .05, p = .02
Education .08, p = .01 .04, p = .08
Religiosity −.03, n.s.
Ethnic origin is nominal and cannot be treated correlationally. Using simple analysis of vari-
ance, its strongest relation is to age, with second-generation Israelis youngest in age, those
born outside of Israel oldest, and those born in Israel of immigrant parents in between
but toward the younger end (η2 = .27, p < .001). Origin is also related to education, with
second-generation Israelis and those of American or European background highest (η2 = .06,
p < .001), and to religiosity, with second-generation and American or European backgrounds
most often secular (η2 = .03, p < .001). When the relation of origin and religiosity is studied
by cross-tabulation, those who are themselves or whose fathers are from Africa/Asia tend
to be traditional (42% and 51%, respectively), as against 22% of those with another origin,
but though the relation is strong, it is far from implying that ethnicity and religiosity over-
lap completely. Origin is unrelated to gender. We also examined three-variable interactions,
but none emerged that substantially changed interpretations, assuming no interaction among
predictor variables.
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Minister Rabin, the Holocaust, and World War II. The ranking is the same
for these four events whether we focus on first mentions or on any mentions;
for later entries such as the Six-Day War, there are only minor differences
between the two methods of ranking. Most of our analysis uses the “any
mentions” last column to provide dependent variables.
The row labeled “All other events” at the bottom of the list includes a va-
riety of smaller categories and single responses: for example, “bringing immi-
grants from Ethiopia” (32 mentions), “Entebbe Operation” (22 mentions),
“Clinton and Monica” (21 mentions), the (first) intifada (mentioned by just
7 Israelis). Our focus here, however, is on the more commonly given events,
as shown in Table I. We note that three of the four most frequently mentioned
events go back to the beginning of Israel as a state and could have been expe-
rienced directly only by Israelis who are now in their 60s or older. The fourth,
Rabin’s assassination in 1995, would have been experienced by almost all
Israeli adults except very recent immigrants. Three of these four dominat-
ing events are emphasized collectively through state-sponsored memorials
during the year.14
14Those not able to mention any event at all (N = 183) are not included in Table I. These people
were significantly less educated, more often women, and more often ultraorthodox—the first
Table I. Most Frequently Mentioned Events by Israelis, 1999–2000a
First mention Combined Respondents mentioning
Event Date (%) numberb an event (%)c
Establishment of Israel 1948 21.2 693 38.5
Rabin’s assassination 1995 14.0 484 26.9
Holocaust a 11.6 369 20.5
World War II 1939–45 11.5 311 17.3
Peace with Egypt 1977–79 4.2 191 10.6
Six-Day War 1967 1.8 156 8.7
Yom Kippur War 1973 1.8 128 7.1
Peace treaty with Jordan 1994 2.6 116 6.5
First man on the moon 1969 2.0 99 5.5
Gulf War 1991 1.6 86 4.8
All other events 28.6 460 —
Total 100 — —
N (1,798) — —
aThis table includes all respondents, from the 1999 and 2000 surveys, who were able to name at
least one event or change that seemed to them important. Omitted are 183 respondents who
said “don’t know,” plus 62 who were labeled “missing data” (incomplete interviews).
bFirst, second, or third mention.
cEach percentage represents the number of respondents who mentioned the event at all,
whether as their first, second, or third mention, divided by the total N of 1,798 respondents
who mentioned any event. For example, 38.5% of the 1,798 respondents who mentioned any
event included the establishment of Israel as a mentioned event.
dThe mass killing of Jews occurred during the World War II years, 1941–1945, but in a larger
sense the Holocaust can be seen as dating from Hitler’s ascension to power in 1933.
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Answers to the same open-ended question are available from studies
in six other countries, with dates of interviewing as shown in parentheses:
England (1990), Germany (1991), Japan (1991), Lithuania (1989), Russia
(1990), and the United States (1985).15 Only one event, World War II, ap-
pears near the top of all seven lists. It is first for Americans, English, Japanese,
and Russians; second for Germans after Reunification, which had occurred
the previous year; third for Lithuanians (after their then recent rebirth as a
nation and their earlier occupation by the USSR); and fourth among Israelis.
Other than World War II, most nominations have to do with issues local to
each nation (e.g., the then recent death of the Emperor in Japan). Of course,
World War II was also a “local” event for all of these countries, and it might
well not have been much mentioned in nations largely uninvolved in the
war, such as several in South America.
The Establishment of Israel and the Assassination of Rabin
We begin our analysis with the two events most frequently mentioned by
Israelis in this 1999 and early 2000 period: Israel’s beginning as a state (1948),
and the recent assassination of Prime Minister Rabin (1995), both plotted
against birth cohorts in Fig. 1.16 As predicted by the hypothesis derived
from Mannheim’s ([1928] 1952) generational theory, we find that the peak
mentions of Israel’s establishment are given by the 1926–1930 birth cohort—
that is, Israelis who were between 18 and 22 in 1948. A broader peaking
stretches over all birth years in our sample prior to 1940, including those
aged 8 through the late 20s when Israel was established. Thus, controlling
for other relevant variables, the findings for this early event—the birth of
Israel as a state—fit quite well predictions made on the basis of theory.
two of these results are in keeping with findings from research in other countries. An additional
62 respondents refused to answer the question, broke off the interview before reaching it, or
were omitted for other reasons. Of the 1798 respondents who named at least one event, 1570
named a second event as well, and a total of 844 respondents named three events.
15See Rieger, 1995; Schuman et al., 1994; Schuman et al., 1998; Schuman and Scott, 1989; Scott
and Zac, 1993.
16The b coefficients and p values shown in this and later figures are from logistic regressions
using age as a 12-category continuous variable, with education, gender, religiosity, and ori-
gin included also as predictors of the dichotomous mention or nonmention of each event.
(Quadratic terms for age are included where curvilinearity appears likely.) However, when
age is plotted in the figures, it is treated as a set of 12 dummy variables to allow for nonlin-
earity. (The oldest respondent in our sample was born in 1912, but most of those in the oldest
category were born between 1920 and 1925.) The percentages in this and other figures assume
that the control variables other than education register as omitted or zero categories, that is,
the last category in each of the variables listed earlier; if a different omitted category were
used, the absolute predicted probabilities could change, but the shape of the curve would
remain the same. Because education is treated as continuous, its coefficient is multiplied by
its mean and added to the intercept in each regression.
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Fig. 1. Mentions of the extablishment of Israel (1948) and the assassination of Robin (1995), by
cohort based on logistic regression, with controls for education, gender, origin, and religiosity.
Israelis who are more highly educated are also significantly more likely
to mention the establishment of Israel (p < .001), so schooling (or its cor-
relates) provides another way of learning about and remembering the past.
Indeed, the relation to our education variable is appreciably stronger than
the relation to the cohort variable (odds ratios 1.43 and 1.10, respectively).
We might expect education to have an even greater impact on younger Is-
raelis who cannot draw on direct experience of 1948, but there is only a
small and insignificant sign of such an interaction when the effect of educa-
tion is considered separately for the six youngest and six oldest cohorts. Men
are more apt to mention the establishment of the nation than are women
(p < .001), which may reflect a difference in political interests, as suggested
by Verba et al. (1997), though we are reluctant to draw such a conclusion
without further evidence. We do find that mentioning the establishment in-
creases with education among both men and women (highly reliable and
roughly similar relations). Disproportionate mentions by men may also turn
partly on the military nature of the struggle for independence, and it is also
possible that women tend to define “important political events” differently
than men.
Orthodox Israelis mention the establishment of Israel more than any
other religiosity category, with the difference largest as against those describ-
ing themselves as either traditional or secular (p < .02). This is consistent
with their seeing the establishment of the state as having profound religious
significance, beyond the political, social, and cultural meaning it had for many
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Zionists, though this may be due at least in part to a redefinition by ortho-
dox Jews after the Six-Day War in 1967 (Kimmerling, 1999). With regard to
ethnic origin, Israelis who have immigrated from African or Asian areas are
less likely to mention the establishment than are others (p< .02), presumably
because in most cases neither they nor their parents nor grandparents were
in Israel in 1948, having arrived in the 1950s or later.17 Among those born
in Europe or America, immigrants from the former Soviet Union are less
likely to mention the establishment of Israel (p < .05), doubtless because
many arrived long after 1948, and it is not so large an event in their minds.
For mentions of Rabin’s assassination in 1995, the peak occurs for the
three youngest cohorts (1966–1982), Israelis who were ages 13–29 at the
time of the assassination, though one might wish to include those born in
1961–1965 also, so that the peak would include those as old as 34 in 1995.
These results also fit the generational model quite well: Almost everyone in
our sample must have been aware of the assassination when it occurred, but
young people are more than twice as likely as the old to give it as one of their
three possible responses, with those intermediate in age also intermediate
in mentions.
We have available a question on self-reported vote in the 1996 election
in which Benjamin Netanyahu defeated Shimon Peres, Rabin’s immediate
successor as prime minister. As would be expected, Peres voters are more
likely to mention the Rabin assassination—which had occurred just 6 months
earlier—than are Netanyahu voters (p < .001 in the multiple regression), but
the difference is not as large as might have been anticipated: 32–22% in a
simple cross-tabulation. Moreover, mentions of the assassination by Peres
voters and Netanyahu voters show similar relations to cohort. In fact, the
concentration of mentions among youth is stronger for Netanyahu voters
(odds ratio = 1.28) than for Peres voters (odds ratio = 1.08). Examination
of the simple cross-tabulations indicates that this is because almost no older
Netanyahu voters mention the assassination, whereas some older Peres vot-
ers do mention it, thus reducing the association with cohort.18
17However, when income is included in regressions, this relation of origin to mentions of the
establishment is less certain, and a positive relation of mentions to above-average income is
highly reliable (p < .001)—the only event where income has this kind of impact. Although
immigrants from Africa/Asia average lower incomes than other Israelis, about a quarter do
report higher than average incomes; if these people arrived early (before, during, or soon after
1948) and have the establishment of the state salient in memory, this could have produced the
reported finding when both income and origin are included in the regression, but unfortunately
we do not have data on their date of arrival.
18Among the 10 events, only for Rabin’s assassination is there a significant relation to 1996 vote
preference. Here especially we would benefit from a “why” follow-up question in order to
interpret the content of mentions (as done by Schuman and Scott, 1989), but limited resources
prevented this further exploration. In the case of Israeli youth, valuable qualitative evidence
on divided views of the assassination is provided by Rapoport (2000).
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Education and gender reveal relations to the assassination that are op-
posite to those shown for the establishment of Israel: The less-educated
and women are significantly more likely to mention this event (p < .001
in both cases), the former probably because less education is needed to be
struck by a recent, highly publicized event than one that occurred many
years earlier. The interpretation of the relation to gender is less certain, but
the U.S. study reported that the 1963 assassination of John F. Kennedy was
also remembered significantly more often by women than by men (Schuman
and Scott, 1989). This suggests that the tragic death of a leader may have
a greater impact on women than on men, consistent with Davis’s (1999)
finding on recall of emotionally meaningful events, especially because in
the case of the Kennedy assassination there was no relation to education.
For the Rabin assassination, the gender difference is visible at all four ed-
ucational levels, but it is much stronger at the two lowest levels. (Evans
[1980:21] reports a similar finding: the gender difference in political interest
in one study was “largely accounted for by the responses of working class
women.”)
Those born outside of Israel, in particular those born in Europe or
America, were less likely to mention the assassination than those of any
other origin (p < .001). That native-born Israelis are more likely to mention
the assassination is probably because of their greater knowledge of Rabin’s
many years as a major military and political leader, long before his final term
as Prime Minister. He represented and symbolized the “state generation” of
Sabra, those born in Israel who participated in the war for independence and
the development of the country from its beginning (Almog, 2000).19 Secu-
lar Jews were more likely to mention the assassination than were the other
three religious groupings (p < .01), which is consistent with the reliance of
the peace movement on the secular part of the population. Rabin was assas-
sinated as he left a huge gathering in support of his efforts at negotiations
with Arafat and the PLO.
The Holocaust
The third most frequently mentioned event in Table I is the Holocaust,
and in this case we have additional information about its direct impact on
our sample. All respondents were asked later in the interview the following
question: “Did you or any of your relatives suffer in the Holocaust?” Those
answering yes were asked to specify who suffered, yielding the following
19Why those from European/American backgrounds are less likely to mention the assassination
than those from Africa/Asia is not so evident, but it is not because they “use up” their three
mentions, for the same result occurs for respondents who mention only a single event.
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A close relative 20%
A distant relative 21%
Nobody suffered 57%
100% (N = 2008)
As would be expected, most of those who said they themselves had suffered
(84% of the 44 people who reported having suffered personally) were of
European or American origin—we assume originally European, although
our questionnaire did not make that distinction. And most of those who said
a close relative had suffered were also of European or American origin or
had fathers of that origin.
Mention of the Holocaust as an important event of the past 60 years is,
understandably, related to its personal impact. Of Israelis who said they were
themselves affected, 30% mentioned the Holocaust as important (which may
seem surprisingly small for those claiming a personal effect); of those with
a close relative affected, the percentage is 27%; a distant relative, 24%;
and nobody affected, 17%. Thus, even many Israelis who did not claim any
personal impact from the Holocaust nevertheless mentioned it as one of the
three most important national or world events of the past 60 years. Mention
of the Holocaust is at best marginally related to education (p = .10); hence,
we can assume that it does not depend much on knowledge of history. Nor is
there any sign of a relation to gender, for reasons that will be clear when we
consider the extent to which knowledge about the Holocaust is continually
transmitted to the entire population through the schools and in other ways.
Birth cohort does seem to be a factor in memories of the Holocaust,
but closer consideration shows the relation to have a different meaning
than was the case for the establishment of Israel or the assassination of
Rabin. As the top line in Fig. 2 indicates, the relation is nonlinear, with
substantial mentions among the three oldest cohorts, and then a leveling off
across all other cohorts. The oldest cohorts are, of course, those that include
Israelis most likely to have been affected personally or in terms of close
relatives. Once beyond the pre-World War II birth years, mentions are no
longer clearly related to cohort (p = n.s.). Therefore, we constructed the
bottom curve in Fig. 2 in order to exclude those respondents who said they
themselves or a close relative had suffered during the Holocaust. Thus, the
bottom curve is unrelated to age, despite the apparent rise for the small
number of people (n = 38) born between 1931 and 1935; that is, neither a
linear nor a quadratic term for age approaches significance (p > .10 in both
regressions). Note also that the two points adjacent to the deviant 1931–1935
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Fig. 2. Mentions of the Holocaust, with and without the effect of personal suffering, by cohort
based on logistic regression, with controls for education, gender, origin, and religiosity.
cohort show the lowest mentions of the entire 12 cohorts, further suggesting
that the apparent exception is due to sampling error or is idiosyncratic in
some way. The conclusion of this analysis by cohort is that once we exclude
those most directly affected by the Holocaust, young Israelis are as likely to
mention it as are those who were alive when it occurred. In fact, the youngest
Israelis in our sample—those born in 1976 or thereafter—tend to mention
the Holocaust more frequently than those a decade or more older and more
often also than many of those in their sixties. These findings provide a striking
exception to the generational theory that we saw supported so clearly for
memories of the establishment of Israel and the assassination of Rabin, and
they therefore call for careful interpretation.
The Holocaust was not a focus in Israel during the early post-World
War II years, as indeed was also true for the United States. But since the
1980s, according to Segev (1993), “not a day has gone by without the Holo-
caust being mentioned in some context or other in one of the daily news-
papers; it is a central subject of literature and poetry, of theater, cinema,
and television” (516). According to Feldman (2000a), it also became an
increasing part of the school curriculum: “The first curriculum in Holo-
caust education was introduced into the school system in 1963 . . . restricted
to a single six-hour unit. . . .Through the late 60s and early 70s the num-
ber of hours devoted to teaching the Holocaust gradually increased. . . . In
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1970 . . . 30 hours of Shoah education [were mandated]” (90–93). (According
to the Statistical Abstract of Israel [Central Bureau of Statistics, Government
of Israel, 1995], 87% of Israeli Jewish children attend the state educational
system.)
In addition to this regular school instruction, youth pilgrimages to death-
camp sites in Europe, supported by the Ministry of Education, began at the
end of the 1980s, and since then thousands of high-school students (about
10% of the high-school population, according to Feldman, 2000a) have
had such experiences themselves and are encouraged to share them with
their schoolmates. Furthermore, Yad Vashem, the Holocaust Memorial in
Jerusalem, is also visited by large numbers of Israelis, including both school-
age students and young military trainees. Finally, each year on Memorial Day
for the Holocaust, a “siren begins, low and deep and rises until it reaches
scream pitch” (Young, 1993:277), while the entire Jewish population stops
for 2 min in remembrance of Jewish victims of the Nazi period, and there are
also fresh reminders by radio and television and in schools. Given all of this
emphasis, much of it directly carried out by agencies of the state, it is little
wonder that the events of the 1940s are still vividly alive for young Israelis
and that the Holocaust has become in important respects “the founding
event of the state” (Feldman, 2000a:29).
As mentions of the Holocaust show little or no relation to cohort, gen-
der, or education—variables that affect most other memories—one wonders
what does distinguish Israelis who give this response from those who do not.
With regard to ethnic origin, Segev (1993) claims that “the Holocaust now
occupies the same place in the Israeli self-image for those of European an-
cestry and those whose origins lie in the Arab world” (516). This seemed
unlikely to be true for respondents who had themselves immigrated to Is-
rael from North Africa or Asia in the years after World War II, and indeed
less than half as many of these mention the Holocaust as do others, though
when the relation is controlled for other variables, the difference reaches
only borderline significance (p < .08). Likewise, once we exclude those who
had suffered in the Holocaust themselves or in connection with a close rel-
ative, Israeli immigrants from America or Europe are also somewhat less
likely than native-born Israelis to mention the Holocaust. However, Segev
is correct when it comes to the children of immigrants from Africa and Asia,
as well as from America or Europe, for they do not differ at all in mentions
of the Holocaust from those whose parents were born in Israel. This pro-
vides further evidence of the effectiveness of the state educational system
and other societal institutions in transmitting knowledge and beliefs about
this singular event from the past.
Religion also plays an unusual role in reported memories of the
Holocaust. The relation is curvilinear (p < .01): the Holocaust is mentioned
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most often by the ultraorthodox, next by the orthodox, third by the secular,
and least by the traditional category. Thus both culture and beliefs play more
of a role here, rather than the demographic factors that tend to divide the
population with regard to mentions of the establishment of Israel, Rabin’s
assassination, and some other events still to be considered.
World War II
In previous studies in the United States, Europe, and Japan, memories
of World War II have shown strong cohort effects, with many more memories
coming from those who were in their youth at the time of the war. However,
all of these countries were directly involved in the war, in most cases by being
bombed or occupied. Moreover, the years of World War II and the years
of the Holocaust were essentially the same, and the two events may have
become bound together in many Israeli minds. Thus, our initial question was
whether mentions of World War II by Israelis would show similar patterns
to those found for the Holocaust, rather than the patterns found in other
countries.
First, as with the Holocaust, Fig. 3 does not show a simple linear relation
of mentions of World War II to birth cohort, as has been found in other
countries. Yet it is evident that a greater percentage of Israelis born before
the end of World War II mention the war as important than is the case
Fig. 3. Mentions of World war II, with and without the effect of personal suffering, by cohort
based on logistic regression, with controls for education, gender, origin, and religiosity.
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for those born after 1945: if the 12 cohorts are dichotomized between the
1941–1945 and 1946–1950 cohort points, the difference is clearly significant
(p < .01). Indeed, this is also reflected in the borderline significance of the
quadratic effect (p = .08) in Fig. 2. Our next step was to determine whether
the pattern is basically similar to that for the Holocaust, and therefore we
constructed a second curve that omits Holocaust sufferers, just as was done
in Fig. 2. The omission does not produce a similar change in this case, but
rather a clearer linear effect (again with an exception for the 1926–1930
cohort, which is based on a tiny number of cases), with a sharp drop after
the 1945 cohort. Thus the patterning by cohort is different from that for the
Holocaust and shows more frequent mentions of World War II by those born
before, during, or just after the war, as is true in other countries.
Other important differences exist between the correlates of World
War II and Holocaust responses, which should not occur if they have essen-
tially the same meaning to respondents. Mentions of World War II are clearly
related to both greater education (p < .001) and to being male (p < .01),
whereas mentions of the Holocaust are not related at all to gender and show
at most a borderline relation to education (p = .10). These results suggest
that World War II responses call on academic knowledge of or interest in
history to a greater extent than do Holocaust responses. (In the United
States also, mentions of World War II were given significantly more often by
men than by women, and likewise were strongly related to education; see
Schuman and Scott, 1989.) The interpretation of the education effect—less-
educated respondents reporting fewer memories of World War II—seems
straightforward in terms of less historical interest or knowledge at lower lev-
els of education. The interpretation of the gender difference may not seem as
clear, but it is difficult to dispute the pattern of results. First, among women,
as among men, the more education a respondent has, the more likely she is
to mention World War II. But, second, with education held constant, at each
educational level men are more likely than women to mention World War
II—significantly so (p < .05) at the level of college graduates. Although we
analyzed the differences by gender with controls for cohort, ethnic origin,
and religiosity, the pattern is also clear from a simple cross-tabulation of the
percentage of each gender at each educational level who mention World
War II:
Men (%) Women (%)
B.A. level & above 32 23
Above high school 25 16
High school graduates 13 10
Less than high school 12 0
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Differences also occur in terms of religiosity and origin. Mentions of
World War II show a highly significant relation to the secular end of the reli-
giosity continuum (p < .001), whereas mentions of the Holocaust tended to
be located in the opposite direction: more mentions by those more orthodox
(p = .11). The pattern for ethnic origin is more complex, but World War II is
mentioned most by those from European and American backgrounds (and
especially recent immigrants from the former USSR)—the countries most
involved in the war—and least by those from Asian/African backgrounds,
whether born in Israel or not, which seems to reflect physical and psycho-
logical distance from the war. Interestingly, while those born in Israel from
African/Asian fathers are less likely to mention World War II than others
born in Israel, they are not less likely to mention the Holocaust than others
born in Israel—which fits our evidence above of the many ways in which all
Israeli children learn about the Holocaust.
Thus we have a good deal of evidence that when Israelis refer to World
War II, many are thinking of the war generally, and are not using the term
only as a reference to the Holocaust, though of course they no doubt rec-
ognize the connection between the two events. Yet we should note one
significant piece of contrary evidence. Given the importance of both World
War II and the Holocaust in Table I, if they are seen as quite distinct, we
might have expected many Israelis to mention both events among their three
responses. For example, of those who mention either the Holocaust or the
establishment of Israel, 22% do mention both, and of those who mention
either World War II or the establishment, 18% mention both. But of those
who mention either the Holocaust or World War II, only 5.6% mention
both. It is plausible that this last percentage is small because at least some
Israelis think that World War II and the Holocaust are so closely related that
mention of the former also includes the latter. Thus, although in many cases
World War II responses seem to stand on their own and are similar to such
responses in other countries, in other cases the responses may imply mention
of the Holocaust as well. In sum, we are undecided on the extent to which
World War II and the Holocaust represent the same or different events in
Israeli memories. Future investigations can clarify this important point by
repeating our open question and then asking respondents what they had in
mind in mentioning World War II.
Two Major Wars
Both in 1967 and 1973 Israel fought major wars with neighboring coun-
tries. The 1967 Six-Day War was seen in Israel and elsewhere as a remark-
able victory, with the occupation of East Jerusalem and the Old City, the
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West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai, and the Golan Heights. The 1973 Yom
Kippur War, however, was a near-disaster, with the sacrifice of many lives in
order to prevent defeat. In 1967, 803 Israelis were killed during the Six-Day
War, but more than three times as many (2,569) were lost during the Yom
Kippur War (Shiff and Haber, 1976:15). Both wars called for mobilization of
the Israeli population, thus bringing the impact of the war home to virtually
everyone.
Although the two wars were only 6 years apart, few respondents (2.3%)
mentioned both, as against 6.4% who mentioned only the Six-Day war and
4.8% who mentioned only the Yom Kippur war. However, the two wars
are similar in that men mention each war more than do women, though
more clearly so for the Six-Day War (p < .001) than the Yom Kippur war
(p < .10). This is consistent with the fact that combat is, for all but the ultra-
orthodox, an important component in defining manhood in Israeli society.
For neither war is there an association of education to mentions, which indi-
cates their familiarity to all Israelis. There is also no relation for either war
to ethnic origin.
There is also one interesting difference. There is no relation of religiosity
to mentions of the 1973 Yom Kippur war, but there is a small but significant
(p < 05) trend for the 1967 Six-Day War to be mentioned more by all three
religious categories than by secular Israelis. On closer examination, frequent
mentions are located especially among the ultraorthodox and orthodox. This
seems likely to be due to the recovery of sites of religious importance, as
well as to the resulting Jewish settlements in the occupied territories and
the increased weight of orthodoxy in the political system more generally.
Indeed, some Israelis gave the Six-Day War a Messianic interpretation and
regarded it as more important than the establishment of the state in 1948
(Aran, 1988).
On the basis of the theory of generational experience discussed earlier,
we expected the relation of cohort to mentions to show signs of curvilin-
earity, with greatest mentions by those in their youth at the time of each
war. The curve for the 1973 Yom Kippur war in Fig. 4 fits this model well,
despite an anomalous drop for the 1946–1950 cohort. The overall quadratic
effect pointing to curvilinearity is highly significant, and even the anoma-
lous 1946–1950 data point is well above the data points for the youngest and
oldest cohorts. (Moreover, the conspicuous deviant point would have been
averaged out if slightly different boundaries had been used to construct the
cohorts.) Overall, the cohorts that were in their youth at the time of the
1973 war are clearly those most likely to mention that war in the 1999–2000
period.
The 1967 Six-Day War presents more of a puzzle. Here again the younger
cohorts (those born after 1960 and therefore either not born or very young
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Fig. 4. Mentions of the Sixth-Day War and the Yom Kippur War, by cohort based on logistic
regression, with controls for education, gender, origin, and religiosity.
at the time of the war) seldom mention it. But the oldest cohorts mention
the Six-Day War in almost the same proportions as those who were in their
youth in 1967. Given the general success of the cohort hypothesis derived
from Mannheim, we should take exceptions as pointing to something special
about the event. We can speculate that this was the deep and lasting impact
of fear among older Israelis of a disaster (another Holocaust?) in the weeks
leading up to the war—this at a point when Israel was still seen as militarily
quite vulnerable—making it more memorable than it would otherwise be.
In any case, considering both curves together, the one definite conclusion
that can be drawn is that Israelis who came of age after the two wars had
ended are not likely to think of them in response to a question about impor-
tant past events. Indeed, considering the very youngest cohort (1976–1982),
the proportions mentioning the Holocaust, which happened some 30 years
before they were born, is as high or higher than mentions of either of the
more recent wars.
Two Peace Treaties
In addition to the wars that Israel has fought over the last half-century,
two important steps toward peace are among the ten most frequently men-
tioned events. The peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, following Sadat’s visit
to Israel in 1977, represented a major detente with Israel’s largest neighbor,
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Fig. 5. Mentions of peace treaties with Egypt and Jorden, by cohort based on logistic regression,
with controls for education, gender, origin, and religiosity.
and in 1994 a peace treaty with Jordan was also signed. The associations
of the two peace initiatives with cohort are shown in Fig. 5.20 In both cases
curvilinearity is evident, though only for Egypt does it reach a clear level
of significance. Although the dates of the treaties are separated by some
16 years, the two curves are fairly similar, with peaks most noticeable for the
1961–1965 cohort, which would have been in its early teens at the time of the
Sadat visit and early 30s at the time of the treaty with Jordan. Only the for-
mer (and more reliable) location fits generational theory precisely, though
the continued height of the 1966–1975 cohorts can do much the same for the
treaty with Jordan. Also noticeable in both cases is the drop for the youngest
cohort, 1976–1982, especially in the case of the Egyptian treaty, which was
then long past.
An even clearer parallel between the two events is that both are men-
tioned significantly more frequently by Israelis at the secular end of the
religiosity dimension and least by both the ultraorthodox and the orthodox
(p < .002 for both events). Assuming that most mentions of the treaties
20This figure departs in one way from previous figures: gender was coded so that men become the
omitted category. This has been done because the strong correlation of gender with the Jordan
peace treaty produces intercepts that are out of line with the overall univariate percentages
for the two treaties. As indicated earlier, the shape of the curves remains the same regardless
of which gender provides the omitted category.
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indicate support for them, this finding is a reflection of where the greatest
emphasis on moves toward peace with Arab neighbors is located within the
religious spectrum, consistent with Arian’s analysis of Israeli values (Arian,
1995). It is interesting that education shows no relation to mentions of either
treaty, suggesting that retrospective acceptance of the importance of these
treaties is not simply a matter of elite parts of the society. Likewise, eth-
nic origin is generally unrelated to mentions of either treaty. The one other
clearly reliable finding is that women are more apt to mention the Jordan
treaty (p < .001), though a similar trend for the treaty with Egypt does not
approach significance (p > .10). Because women were also more likely to
mention the Rabin assassination, the several findings would be consistent
with somewhat greater emphasis on moves toward peace by women than
men, though we have no direct evidence for this and there is some evidence
from another study indicating no gender difference in this regard (Herman
and Yuchtman-Yaar, 1997).
The Gulf War
The final two events in Table I are the Gulf War in 1991 and the moon
landing in 1969. The first, although originally not connected directly to Israel,
soon involved missiles fired at the country from Iraq and the possibility of
more direct involvement. Figure 6 presents a reduced curve for the Gulf
War—reduced because so few older Israelis mentioned the Gulf War that
it is necessary to combine all respondents born before 1921 into a single
category in order to obtain valid statistical estimates. With this adjustment,
the relation of mentions to cohort is clearly linear, with a substantial step up
for those under the age of 40 in 1991 when the Gulf war took place, and a
second sharp increase for the youngest cohort (1976–1982) that was in early
adolescence at the time of the war. These results fit generational theory well,
with the maximum impact of the war on memory for the youngest Israelis, a
lesser but still substantial impact for those under age 40 (a high proportion
of whom were parents and had to cope with fear of missile and gas attacks
on their children), and little evidence of any impact on older Israelis.
There is no sign of a relation between either education or gender and
mentions of the Gulf War, but religiosity does present a clear association:
ultraorthodox and orthodox respondents mention the Gulf War more often
than those reporting themselves traditional or secular (p < .01). (Mentions,
using odds ratios, decrease ordinally from the highest for the ultraortho-
dox to the lowest for the secular.) The missile attack by Iraq differed from
previous military attacks on Israel in where the threat was felt most imme-
diately: not in the front lines by soldiers in combat or their families, but in
the cities where civilians lived, including areas inhabited by more orthodox
P1: GDX/GCY P2: GCR
Sociological Forum [sofo] pp756-sofo-460743 February 14, 2003 19:58 Style file version June 4th, 2002
Israeli Memories 127
Fig. 6. Mentions of the Gulf War (1991), by cohort based on logistic regression, with controls
for education, gender, origin, and religiosity.
Israelis—thus providing an explanation for this distinctive relation to reli-
giosity. There is no general relation of the Gulf War to ethnic origin, though
among Israelis whose fathers were born in Europe or America, the Gulf War
is mentioned somewhat more by immigrants from the former Soviet Union,
many of whom were experiencing an attack for the first time.
The Moon Landing and Other External Events
Unlike all the events discussed so far, mentions of the moon landing
show virtually no patterning at all by age in our regressions. This may seem
peculiar, given its precise date and unique content, but exactly the same
thing happened in 1985 with a national sample of Americans (Schuman and
Scott, 1989). Apparently the moon landing captures a specialized interest
over the entire age range, from those already old when it occurred to those
too young to have been born at that point in time. Here is a cross-tabulation
of mentions of the moon landing by age (without controls):
Age 75+ 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–45 35–39 30–34 25–29 10–24
Moon 3.3% 9.1% 6.3% 6.8% 2.7% 6.7% 4.8% 6.9% 5.5% 4.3% 4.1% 5.9%
N 60 33 63 88 74 163 166 202 183 187 217 305
The percentage of mentions by those 18–24, a cohort not even born in 1969, is
slightly larger than the average percentage (5.5%) for the sample as a whole.
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Evidently the interest in this extraordinary event continues with some young
Israelis into the present. This is not a matter of educational level, which
shows only a small and insignificant trend (p > .10) for greater education to
be associated with mentions of the moon landing.
However, men are more likely than women to mention the landing (p <
.01), and religiosity also shows a clear relation, with mentions increasing from
lowest among the ultraorthodox to highest among the secular (p < .01). The





The variation by religiosity seems interpretable as a function of turning to-
ward or away from science. (Here we should distinguish space exploration,
which is a matter of purely scientific interest, from technological advances
such as computing that offer practical uses to business and even religious
communications and therefore may not show the same association to reli-
giosity.) It is more difficult to interpret the gender relation except possibly as
a function of stereotypic greater male interest in technology and exploration,
especially as it occurs at all educational levels. Finally, second-generation
Israelis and those from America or Europe tend to mention the moon land-
ing more frequently than do those born in Africa or Asia (p < .10).
In addition to the moon landing, several other events mentioned by
Israelis refer to happenings outside of and not directly connected to Israel.
The most frequent of these “external events” are the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the recent war in Kosovo, but a few others are mentioned as well, scat-
tered over time and around the world, such as the Great Depression, the
assassination of John Kennedy, and the Clinton/Lewinsky affair. We created
a single new variable that combined all such external events except the moon
landing and analyzed it as we had other particular events. It seemed possible
that this new “external events” variable would be related to higher educa-
tion, regarded as an indicator of interest in the larger world, but no relation
appears in a standard multiple logistic regression. Only two variables show
an association, and these are both just barely significant (p < .05). First,
more secular Israelis are likely to mention external events generally, just as
occurred with the specific moon landing event. Second, women are more
likely to mention external events than men, the opposite of what occurred
with the moon landing. When we look at specific events within the variable,
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however, the largest percentage difference involves disproportionate men-
tion by women of the death of Princess Diane (one mention by a man, eight
by women). There is no sign of a gender difference in either direction with
regard to Kosovo or the fall of the Berlin Wall.
CONCLUSIONS
Asked to recall the national or world events of the past 60 years that
seemed to them most important, Israeli Jews remembered first and foremost
events that are commemorated in connection with the founding of Israel
itself. If we sum the most frequently given first responses—the Holocaust
and the establishment of Israel—they come to a third of all first mentions.
To this we can add many of the World War II responses, some of which
probably refer to the Holocaust and others to the emergence of Israel out
of the war. Had Americans been asked the same question in the first half
of the nineteenth century, they too might well have given priority to events
from the American Revolution and the creation of the Republic.
Table II summarizes the main relationships discovered in our research,
though the table cannot include some subtle features apparent in the figures
and discussed in preceding pages. Each of the five social background factors
that we drew on plays a distinctive role in explaining why one or more of the
ten most frequently given events is recalled. Here we review and discuss the
results that seem most interesting and important.
Cohort effects are the most easily interpreted results, as the relation
usually appears because of the respondents who disproportionately remem-
ber an event they had personally experienced during their adolescence or
early adulthood, as both generational theory and previously reported re-
search would lead one to expect. This is true for the oldest cohorts in terms
of remembering two early events, World War II and the establishment of the
state in 1948; for the youngest cohorts in remembering two recent events,
the assassination of Rabin and the Gulf War; and for cohorts middling in
terms of birth year who tended to recall two events from the middle years
of Israel’s history, the Yom Kippur War and the peace with Egypt.
Of course, not every past event shows the exact cohort effect predicted,
but as Lieberson (1992:7) urges, “If theories are posed in probabilistic terms,
i.e., specifying that a given set of conditions will alter the likelihood of a
given outcome, . . . [we will] be freed from assuming that negative evidence
automatically means that a theory is wrong.” Such negative evidence should,
however, point to complicating factors that deserve to be pursued (Kendall
and Wolf, 1955). The most important negative cohort result in our study is
that for the Holocaust, where there is no evidence for the kind of generational
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Table II. Summary of Statistically Significant Findings Between 10 Events and Cohort,
Education, Gender, Ethnicity, and Religiosity∗
Cohort Education Gender Ethnicity Religiosity Other
Establishment Oldest Higher Men Native-born More
orthodox
Rabin Youngest Lower Women Second More Peres
generation secular voters
Holocaust No relation No relation No relation First or second Orthodoxa Personally
generation affected
World War II Oldest Higher Men Europe/ Secular
American
origin
Peace with Middle No relation Women(?) No relation Secular
Egypt
Six-Day Middle and No relation Men No relation More
War older orthodox
Yom Kippur Middle No relation Men No relation No relation
War
Peace with Middle(?) No relation Women No relation Secular
Jordan
First man on No relation No relation Men Not Africa/ Secular
the moon Asia
Gulf War Youngest No relation No relation Russians Orthodox
∗ p < .05. Question marks indicate nonsignificant trends.
aCurvilinear: Those who are traditional are less likely to mention than the ultraorthodox,
orthodox, or secular.
effect predicted for a very early event, once those who suffered personally
are excluded. In this case the explanation seems clear: the success of the
continuing efforts by the state and its institutions in keeping the meaning
of the Holocaust alive for Israelis of all ages has nullified the effect due to
cohort experience.
Education provides an alternative and competing way of learning about
the distant past, and therefore years of schooling should be positively asso-
ciated with memories of early events. This is indeed true for World War II
and for the establishment of the state. On the other hand, the Rabin assas-
sination was both recent and filled the news channels, so it is not surprising
that mentioning it does not require educational achievement, and indeed it
is associated with less than average schooling. The reason why some other
events show no relation to educational level is less clear, but the absence of a
relation for the Holocaust points again to the actions of the state: these start
as early as kindergarten and involve annual public commemorations, so that
higher education is not needed for the Holocaust to be brought readily to
mind.
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Gender relations are more difficult to interpret. Originally we thought in
terms of socially sanctioned gender roles, as indeed may well be the case with
men mentioning the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars more than do women.
But in addition, it is difficult to avoid seeing certain results as fitting some
patterned differences in terms of political interests, especially since much the
same findings have appeared in other countries. Men are more likely than
women to recall the same two early events that are associated with greater
education, World War II and the establishment of the state, while women
recall the Rabin assassination more than do men. The latter finding, along
with the disproportionate mention by women of the peace treaty with Jordan
and a similar trend for the treaty with Egypt suggests a more pacific attitude
among women, though evidence from another study cited does not bear
this out. We stress that these empirical findings do not identify underlying
explanations for differences, which may have to do with socialization forces
open to change.
Men and women also differ in their ranking of the events themselves,
especially when considered separately by educational levels (high school
or less versus some college or more). Women with more education and
both more- and less-educated men mention the establishment most often
and are similar in other ways, but less-educated women clearly give Rabin’s
assassination most often. Thus less-educated women especially gravitate to
a recent tragic event that involved the peace process. Both Evans (1980) and
Randall (1987) suggest that gender differences in apparent interest in politics
may reflect a somewhat different conceptualization of what is important
politically by men and women.
Religiosity also appears to have more than one meaning. In the case
of the Gulf War, the higher mentions by the orthodox suggest their remem-
bered fear of direct attack from Iraqi missiles. On most other events, the
more orthodox are low relative to secular Israelis: they are less interested
in the secular past (World War II); less concerned about Rabin’s fate (the
assassination); less apt to mention peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan;
less likely mention scientific exploration (the moon landing). However, they
are more likely to see as important both the establishment of Israel and the
Six-Day War, because we believe, the events have received a larger religious
interpretation.
Ethnicity is the most difficult of the five social factors to summarize,
largely because it does not provide a simple, ordinal scale of more and less,
as do education and cohort, nor is it dichotomous, as is gender. But again
personal experience seems important, because it is Israelis who were born
in Israel of Israeli parents who are most apt to mention Rabin, a person
who had become known over the years in a variety of leadership roles, not
only as the recent prime minister. Likewise, World War II is recalled more
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by those from American or European backgrounds, the areas of the world
most directly involved in the war.
Although the use of these five social background factors provides con-
siderable insight into why particular events are remembered as important by
Israelis of different backgrounds, we recognize that people can have differ-
ent reasons for choosing the same event. For most of the events, and espe-
cially for those like World War II, the Holocaust, and Rabin’s assassination,
it would be helpful in future research to explore with further open-ended
questions the reasons people offer for their choices. In the one case where
this was done for Americans (Schuman and Scott, 1989), it did not contradict
the analysis by cohort and other variables, but it did throw additional light
on the connections people made between an objective event and their own
personal experiences.
An Illuminating Exception
In many ways our negative results for memories of the Holocaust are
especially important for what they tell about Israeli memories now and in
the future. First, of course, the Holocaust appears among the three most
frequently offered events: third after the establishment of the state itself,
and the assassination of Rabin, the latter a unique and traumatic recent
event that symbolized major divisions within the country. But it is not the
percentage of Israelis who mention the Holocaust that is most important,
because, after all, well over half the sample did not offer it as one of the
three most important events from the past. Rather, it is the pattern of rela-
tionships and nonrelationships that it shows that emphasizes its continuing
significance today. For one thing, the fact that remembering the Holocaust
does not depend on cohort experience means that it is not likely to fade from
living memory as will most past events, including even World War II, which
in Israel as elsewhere shows a clear dependence on age. Nor are memories
of the Holocaust a function of advanced education, as is true of most events
from the distant past in all countries that have been studied. Likewise, the
Holocaust is equally remembered by men and women, unlike the establish-
ment of the state and the assassination of Rabin, so it is not “gendered,” and
it has been learned as well by those who are children of immigrants as by
those whose parents grew up in Israel. Finally, and especially important in
a society increasingly divided along religious lines, the Holocaust shows an
unusual relation to religiosity: it is mentioned most by those at the orthodox
pole but then next most by those at the secular pole, so it is an event that
provides some possibility of unity in memory rather than division.
All these findings suggest that the Holocaust—partly because of the
powerful ways in which it continues to be commemorated for, and commu-
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nicated to, both children and adults—remains a fundamental constituent of
Israeli memory and therefore of Israeli identity. A 1993 study by Yair Auron
found that 80% of the students in one college for training teachers—who
in turn of course teach children—agreed with the statement that “we are
all Holocaust survivors.” To an important degree, this sense of a historic
victimization from six decades ago draws on both individual and collective
memory to provide a common perspective for Israelis.21 In that sense the
Holocaust becomes for many Israelis a question that history posed about
the fate of the Jews, a question to which the establishment of the state and
its continued strength is thought to provide an answer. Thus, remembering
the Holocaust as one of the most important events from the past sixty years
shows the effectiveness of state and related institutional actions in “keeping
the past alive.”
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